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IMPLICIT FOLLOWERSHIP THEORIES AND UNETHICAL LEADERSHIP 0 
Abstract 
Our research examines the role of followers in unethical leadership. Drawing on a 
social-cognitive approach to leadership and recent research in the field of behavioral ethics, 
we focus on how leader behavior and follower information processing interact to produce 
unethical outcomes. In two studies and using an experimental design simulating an in-basket 
exercise, we examine to what extent individual implicit assumptions regarding the follower 
role (i.e., implicit followership theories, IFTs) relate to employees’ tendency to comply with 
unethical suggestions made by a leader. In Study 1, controlling for possible alternative 
explanations such as personal need for structure, romance of leadership, and moral 
disengagement, we found that the IFT Good Citizen increased and the IFT Insubordination 
decreased followers' tendencies to contribute to unethical leadership. In Study 2, we varied 
the unethical leader's suggestions to further investigate the conditions under which these 
effects occur and included authoritarianism as an additional control variable. Overall, our 
findings suggest that IFTs make a unique contribution to our understanding of the role of 
followers in unethical leadership, and that this contribution depends on the way leaders frame 
their unethical request. Interaction effects suggest that follower characteristics need to be 
considered as they are embedded in specific situational settings rather than as isolated traits. 
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How the influence of unethical leaders on followers is affected by their implicit 
followership theories 
Unethical developments in organizations are often attributed to bad leaders or leaders’ 
failure to implement moral standards. While this approach can be useful to explain unethical 
acts directly conducted by leaders (e.g., Einarsen, Aasland, & Skogstad, 2007; Schyns & 
Schilling, 2013; Tepper, 2007), unethical leadership transcends beyond the leaders' own 
behavior (Brown & Mitchell, 2010). When trying to explain cases in which leaders fulfil their 
unethical intentions through the acts of followers (Krasikova, Green, & LeBreton, 2013), 
focusing on the leader alone might not suffice (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007; Uhl-Bien, 
Riggio, Lowe, & Carsten, 2014). As leaders influence organizational outcomes indirectly 
through their followers' behavior (Lord & Dinh, 2014; Shamir, 2007), some forms of 
(unethical) leadership only take effect when employees internalize the follower role (DeRue 
& Ashford, 2010) and embody this role in a way that contributes to (unethical) leadership 
(Carsten, & Uhl-Bien, 2013; Morrison, 1994).  
Employees use roles such as leader and follower as cues to structure their 
expectations about the adequate behavior of people who occupy these positions (Carsten, 
Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, & McGregor, 2010; Ilgen & Hollenbeck, 1991). Social-cognitive 
approaches to leadership (Lord & Maher, 1991) showed that when constructing these roles, 
employees draw upon their cognitive structures and schemas regarding traits and behaviors of 
leaders and followers, that is, implicit leadership and followership theories (ILTs and IFTs; 
Shondrick & Lord, 2010; Sy, 2010) as an interpretative frame. More recently, conceptual 
papers (Epitropaki, Sy, Martin, Tram-Quon, & Topakas, 2013; van Gils, van Quaquebeke, & 
van Knippenberg, 2010) suggested that ILTs and IFTs also influence how people interpret 
their own roles. What followers (implicitly) associate with their role should thus influence the 
nature of their contribution to a broad range of organizational outcomes, including (un)ethical 
leadership (Carsten, & Uhl-Bien, 2013; Parker, 2007). 
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Considering employees' implicit theories seems to be particularly promising in order 
to understand when and why employees contribute to unethical leadership in ambiguous 
situations (Moore & Gino, 2013; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Particularly in the 
business context, individuals are faced with sometimes contradicting demands tempting them 
to prefer the interest of the organization over external effects (Giacalone & Thompson, 2006; 
Reynolds, Leavitt, & DeCelles, 2010). Unethical leaders may take advantage of this 
ambiguity by linking unethical behavior to valued organizational outcomes. As we will 
explain in more detail in the theory section, behavioral ethics research (Trevino, Weaver, & 
Reynolds, 2006) suggests that, in such situations, not only employees with clearly negative 
characteristics may engage in unethical behavior. Consequently, besides identifying the 'bad 
apples' who conduct clearly illegal behaviors such as theft and fraud (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, 
& Trevino, 2010), we need to understand unethical behavior when those who exert it a) may 
not have the characteristics of people typically seen as unethical, b) may not realize that they 
contribute to unethical acts, and c) might even think that they contribute to the good of the 
company (Moore & Gino, 2013; Reynolds et al., 2010).  
Applying behavioral ethics and social-cognitive approaches to leadership and 
followership, our research extends the current knowledge in three ways. First, we provide 
evidence for followers’ contributions to unethical leadership. As we will review in the 
beginning of the article, this has been acknowledged as important but has not been in the 
focus of prior research. Second, we examine how followers’ implicit role construction – 
defined as the extent to which individuals possess particular IFTs – interacts with unethical 
leader behavior to co-produce unethical outcomes. We approach this aim by linking 
behavioural ethics research and IFTs. Notably, we introduce IFTs as an indicator of 
followers’ implicit role orientation, therefore complementing the currently dominant 
approach of examining leader-rated IFTs and how they influence leader behavior (Junker & 
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van Dick, 2014). Third, we add to the growing field of IFTs research by examining the 
consequences of IFTs with respect to unethical behavior and unethical leadership. We 
approach these three contributions with two studies in which we manipulate unethical 
requests made by a leader and examine how followers' IFTs influence their compliance. To 
examine the extent to which IFTs have a unique effect, we control for followers' individual 
differences that have been previously linked to followers' compliance with unethical leaders. 
Theoretical Background 
The role of followers in unethical leadership 
Unethical leadership comprises "behaviors conducted and decisions made by 
organizational leaders that are illegal and/or violate moral standards, and those that impose 
processes and structures that promote unethical conduct by followers" (Brown & Mitchell, 
2010, p. 588). While a leader can conduct unethical acts such as fraud and theft 
independently, leadership requires that one person (e.g., a manager) claims the leader role 
and at least one other person grants the leader role and accepts the follower role (DeRue & 
Ashford, 2010). Thus, some forms of leadership only occur when unethical leaders’ influence 
attempts are met by followers whose characteristics make them susceptible to such attempts 
(Krasikova et al., 2013; Lipman-Blumen, 2004; Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2007).  
Attempts to identify the characteristics of followers that contribute to unethical forms 
of leadership (for reviews, see Thoroughgood, Padilla, Hunter, & Tate, 2012; Uhl-Bien et al., 
2014) resulted in follower classifications such as bystanders and authoritarians. These 
follower types contribute to unethical leadership due to their inability to resist unethical 
influence attempts or their pursuit of personal gain through association with unethical leaders. 
However, evidence suggests that, at times, individuals engage in unethical behaviors even 
though they lack negative traits or selfish intentions (Moore & Gino, 2013). Employees 
sometimes engage in unethical behaviors due to prioritizing organizational goals over other 
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concerns (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Dietz, Reizenstein, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000) or 
because they aim at benefitting their organization (Umphress & Bingham, 2010). Indeed, 
classical social psychological studies and descriptions of historic events (e.g., Bauman, 1989; 
Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012) showed that good intentions and unethical acts are not 
necessarily contradictory. To give an example, in Milgram's (1974) studies, participants 
explained why they gave apparently deadly shocks citing the aim of contributing to the 
improvement of learning strategies and to help the experiment(er) to be successful.  
These findings suggest that, to understand the many ways through which followers 
contribute to unethical leadership, we need to consider a broad range of employee 
characteristics and their specific interaction with context conditions (Judge, Piccolo, & 
Kosalka, 2009) complementing the current focus on negative traits and deficits. Moreover, 
recent research in the field of behavioral ethics (Bazerman & Gino, 2012) revealed that 
(un)ethical behavior is only partly determined by deliberate choice; to a considerable extent, 
it is based on reflexive, automatic, and intuitive processes (Haidt, 2001; Moore & Gino, 
2013; Reynolds, 2006). Linking social-cognitive approaches to leadership and followership 
(Shondrick & Lord, 2010) and recent research in behavioral ethics, we propose that the way 
employees implicitly construct their follower role is a neglected reason for their susceptibility 
to unethical leaders. 
Implicit influences on followers' (un)ethical behavior 
Normative approaches to ethics focus on how people ought to act (e.g., Kohlberg, 
1984). Consequently, when a leader instructs a follower to conduct an unethical act, the 
follower will deliberately weigh benefits and costs of either complying or resisting the 
leader's unethical request. Behavioral ethics research, in contrast, focuses on how people 
actually behave when facing a moral issue (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crow, 2008). They 
emphasize that implicit processes such as habits, schemas, and intuitions drive a great deal of 
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human behavior (Bargh, 1997), and that this also applies to (un)ethical behaviors. Implicit 
information processing and responding to moral stimuli means that "introspectively 
unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience" (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995, p. 15) influence both perceptions and evaluations made in current situations. These 
processes are, in turn, influenced by contextual cues and individual differences. To give an 
example, when participants held the implicit assumption that business is inherently moral and 
contextual cues framed the situation as competitive, they showed more immoral behavior in 
business-related tasks (Reynolds et al., 2010).  
Interactionist versions of implicit approaches to ethical behavior (Reynolds et al., 
2010) seem particularly relevant for explaining follower contributions to unethical leadership. 
As leadership is an interactive process including leaders and followers, a leader's unethical 
request functions as a contextual cue. Followers deal with this cue based on their prior 
experiences which are stored in long-term memory in the form of knowledge structures. 
These knowledge structures comprise idiosyncratic memories and schemas, but also existing 
expectations of how people who occupy specific roles should behave (Katz & Kahn, 1978; 
Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Followers' ideas and beliefs about their role (Morrison, 1994; 
Neale & Griffin, 2006) result in differing assumptions regarding “what types and breadth of 
tasks, goals, and problems they see within their set of responsibilities, and how they believe 
they should approach those tasks, goals, and problems” (Parker, 2007, p.404). To what extent 
these potentially multifarious role constructions include contributing to unethical acts is the 
focus of the current research. 
Implicit followership theories and unethical leadership 
Implicit leadership and followership theories (ILTs and IFTs; for reviews, see 
Epitropaki et al., 2013; Shondrick & Lord, 2010) are cognitive structures and schemas about 
traits and behaviors of followers and leaders that, in contrast to scientific theories, represent 
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social constructions. ILTs and IFTs are developed through processes of socialization and 
prior experiences with relevant stimuli. They are stored in memory and activated whenever 
individuals interact with (potential) representatives of the categories leader and follower 
(Eden & Leviatan, 1975; Kenney, Schwartz-Kenney, & Blascovich, 1996). 
In a first approach to conceptualize content, structure, and consequences of IFTs, Sy 
(2010) differentiated six dimensions of followership: Industry, Enthusiasm, and Good Citizen 
as well as Conformity, Insubordination, and Incompetence. These dimensions form two 
second order factors: a Followership Prototype and a Followership Antiprototype, 
respectively. Their inherent positive and negative connotation stems from the assumption that 
the followership prototype is positively and the antiprototype is negatively related to 
followership effectiveness. Follower characteristics that signify effectiveness, however, may 
not necessarily imply ethicality. As we discussed above, well-meaning followers contribute 
to unethical outcomes at times (e.g., Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2013; Umphress & Bingham, 
2010). Against this background, we need to consider how the different IFTs may relate to 
(un)ethical behavior. In the following, we start this endeavor by developing hypotheses 
regarding the question which IFTs may make it more or less likely that followers contribute 
to unethical leadership by complying with a leader's unethical advice. 
IFTs that might facilitate followers’ contribution to unethical leadership 
Conformity has been associated with followership in the organizational behavior 
literature (Oc & Bashshur, 2013), in analyses of historical situations of unethical follower 
compliance (e.g., crimes of obedience; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), and in the literature on 
susceptible followers in the context of unethical and, more generally, destructive leadership 
(Padilla et al., 2007; Thoroughgood et al., 2012). In Carsten et al.'s (2010) exploratory study, 
just over one-third of the participating employees had a passive construction of the follower 
role emphasizing lack of responsibility, following orders, and deferring to the leader's 
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knowledge and expertise. Sy’s (2010) assessment of “Conformity” as an IFT comprises the 
items Easily Influenced, Follows Trends, and Soft Spoken. We expect that employees who 
associate the follower role with these attributes are more likely to comply with a leader’s 
advice, even if they are unethical, than those who do not do so.  
The IFTs Industry and Enthusiasm comprise the items Hardworking, Productive, and 
Goes above and beyond for Industry as well as Excited, Outgoing, and Happy for 
Enthusiasm. Those attributes are associated with strong in-role performance and affiliative 
forms of extra-role behavior. However, they are not necessarily related to critical thinking 
and challenging forms of extra-role behavior (Carsten et al., 2010; van Dyne, Cummings, & 
McLean Parks, 1995). People who are dedicated to achieving a specific goal (as reflected in 
“Industry”) might be blind to any side-effects of their behavior; followers who associate their 
role with enthusiasm, in turn, might be less attentive to negative outcomes when executing a 
leader’s advice (Barbuta, 2000; Darley & Batson, 1973; Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014). Thus, we 
expect followers who associate their role with industry and enthusiasm to follow a leader's 
advice more readily.  
Our expectations regarding the influence of the IFT Good Citizen are mixed. On the 
one hand, Epitropaki et al. (2013) suggested that Good Citizen might be the only IFT that is 
related to being ethical. On the other hand, this suggestion might be problematic given that 
IFTs are not independent of the specific context and as such are tied to obligations to specific 
relational others (Leavitt, Reynolds, Barnes, Schilpzand, & Hannah, 2012). Taking into 
account that Sy (2010) defines this dimension using the items Loyal, Reliable, and Team 
Player, associating the follower role with being a Good Citizen might have a flipside. That is, 
when followers receive a leader’s advice that is linked to a possible benefit for the 
organization although the consequences might be unethical, then followers who associate 
their role with being a Good Citizen might behave unethically. This possibility is in line with 
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the above-mentioned research and theory that employees sometimes engage in unethical acts 
with the intent to benefit their organization, its members, or both (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; 
Brief et al., 2000; Reynolds et al., 2010; Umphress & Bingham, 2010).  
In sum, we propose that associating the follower role with conformity, industry, 
enthusiasm, and being a good citizen might make employees susceptible to comply with a 
leader's unethical request and thus contribute to unethical leadership. We expect: 
Hypothesis 1: IFTs Conformity, Industry, Enthusiasm, and Good Citizen moderate 
the relationship between a leader's unethical advice and follower compliance. Employees 
who hold these IFTs are more likely to contribute to unethical leadership if advised to do so 
by a supervisor. 
IFTs that might inhibit followers’ contribution to unethical leadership 
We expect that employees who hold the IFT Insubordination should be less likely to 
accept a leader’s advice. Employees who associate the follower role with items such as 
Arrogant, Rude, and Bad Tempered, are not likely to accept authority at all and thus refuse to 
grant leadership to others (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). As leaders’ influence is indirect through 
followers (Shamir, 2007; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014), unethical leadership will not unfold in cases 
where employees refuse to accept leadership claims. Thus, ironically, the negatively connoted 
IFT Insubordination might prevent the organization from harm when followers with this IFT 
disrupt an unethical leaders’ agenda. We do not have particular expectations regarding the 
IFT Incompetence, as the respective items Uneducated, Slow, and Inexperienced are not 
related to either ethical or unethical behavior. Consequently, we expect: 
Hypothesis 2: IFT Insubordination moderates the relationship between a leader’s 
unethical advice and compliance. Employees who hold this IFT are less likely to contribute to 
unethical leadership if advised to do so by a superior.  
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Study Overview 
Our aim to examine the influence of implicit processes on followers’ tendency to contribute 
to unethical leadership required a rather subtle strategy. Hence, we designed a situation in 
which employees were confronted with a superior’s advice to carry out an unethical act 
within the scope of an extensive in-basket exercise (for similar approaches, see Brief et al., 
2000; Petersen & Dietz, 2000, 2008). In-basket exercises are typical components of 
assessment centers and are thus supposed to have considerable external validity (Bartol & 
Martin, 1990). That is why we preferred in-basket exercises over scenarios which also have 
been used in research on unethical behavior before (e.g., Carsten et al., 2010). In two studies, 
we adopted Brief et al.’s (2000, see also Petersen & Dietz, 2008) design to examine whether 
(and which) IFTs increase or decrease followers' tendency to comply with a leader’s advice 
and thus contribute to unethical leadership. Furthermore, we varied the leader’s unethical 
advice in the two studies to specify the conditions under which these contributions occur. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 187 individuals (80% female) with a mean age of 32.1 years 
(SD = 8.5). Of the participants, 116 were employed, 23 were self-employed, and 48 were not 
employed at the time of the study. Participants were enrolled in a distance education 
psychology programme (MBA equivalent) at a German university and took part in this study 
in partial fulfillments of course requirements. Thirty-four per cent of the employees worked 
in small organizations (up to 20 employees), 32% worked in middle-size organizations (21-
500 employees), 18% worked in bigger organizations (501-10000 employees), and 16% 
worked in large organizations (more than 10000 employees). Seventy-five per cent held 
entry-level positions, 13% were in lower management, and 12% were in middle or higher 
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management. Different industries were represented in the sample, most of which were social 
and health care (21%), education (13%), sales and distribution (9%), manufacturing (9%), 
public administration (5%), and other services (23%). Half of the participants worked part-
time (less than 30 h/week). As 12 participants had a nationality other than German, we 
included nationality as control variable in the analyses. 
Procedure 
In the first part of the in-basket exercise, participants were asked to adopt the role of 
Mr. Riedel, a middle-manager in a German fast-food chain. They received information about 
the structure of the company and the responsibilities of Mr. Riedel. Participants then worked 
on a series of tasks, for example, they decided on salaries for new employees, the 
organization of training programs, and applications for annual leave. In the second part of the 
in-basket exercise, participants were asked by the CEO to screen the applications of eight 
candidates in order to suggest three who would be invited for a job interview. Four candidates 
were native Germans and four were immigrants as was apparent on the candidates’ CV: they 
were either both raised and educated in European Mediterranean countries and had a foreign 
name or raised and educated in Germany and had a German name. Participants were 
instructed to respect two criteria when selecting candidates: the candidates should have 
experience in the food industry and in sales. Two German and two immigrant candidates 
fulfilled both criteria and were therefore equally qualified for the job in question. The other 
two German and two immigrant candidates met only one of the two criteria and thus were not 
qualified.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the control 
condition, instructions were merely to select the best candidates. In the experimental 
condition, the CEO’s instruction included a statement indicating that immigrants might not be 
appropriate for the position in question. The wording of the statement was: “While reading 
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the applications, I observed that there are foreigners among the applicants. When selecting an 
applicant, it is important to keep in mind that our staff in the headquarters consists almost 
exclusively of Germans. In the past, homogeneity of the human resources team has 
contributed very strongly to good teamwork and company success. Because of this the new 
head of the human resources team must be a guarantor of a ‘good chemistry’ in that team.”  
As it constitutes discrimination (Dietz & Kleinlogel, 2015), complying with the 
instructions of this superior represents a follower’s contribution to unethical leadership as 
defined above (see Brown & Mitchell, 2010). We aimed at examining an ambiguous 
situation, because in such situations, individual differences are more influential than in strong 
situations (Knoll, Lord, Petersen, & Weigelt, 2016; Mischel, 1977). Behavioral ethics 
research also revealed that employees may be particularly susceptible to engage in unethical 
behaviors if good intentions and unethical behaviors are entangled. That is why in our study, 
the discrimination was veiled as a positive act, in that the CEO suggested discriminating to 
keep a work-force homogeneous. Note that following the leader's advice may facilitate 
cohesion and thus potentially benefit the organization, discrimination remains an unethical 
act. 
Controlling for Alternative Explanations 
When confronted with a leader's advice to act unethical (here: to discriminate in a 
personnel selection task), followers could reconstruct the advice so that it is not viewed as 
immoral (because it is to the benefit of the organization), reduce their sense of agency by 
minimizing their role in the situation (as they just followed orders), or fail to see the 
consequences of their action (e.g., do not think about the consequences for the applicant that 
is not invited). Bandura (1999) suggested that individuals are more likely to engage in 
unethical acts if they apply a number of cognitive mechanisms (e.g., moral justification, 
palliative comparison, ignoring or misconstructing the consequences) to convert immoral acts 
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so that they do not deviate from their moral standards. As such mechanisms of moral 
disengagement might facilitate followers’ tendency to contribute to unethical organizational 
practices and thus question the relevance of IFTs, we include a measure of propensity for 
moral disengagement (Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012) as a control variable.  
Another potential alternative explanation for the hypothesized effects is that followers 
may tend to displace responsibility for the unethical act to their leader (Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 
2013; Milgram, 1974). Romance of leadership (ROL; Meindl, 1995) describes the tendency 
to make leaders responsible for the success and/or failure of an organization. Research has 
shown that ROL is not only related to the perception of leaders, but also to decision making 
(Felfe & Petersen, 2007). Thus, ROL could be related to the decision to comply with a 
leader's advice as followers high in ROL might have a stronger tendency to delegate 
responsibility for decision making to the leader (Bligh & Schyns, 2007).  
Furthermore, it is possible that a more basic cognitive process might explain the 
expected findings and thus render IFTs redundant. Cognitive rigidity, for example, has been 
linked to unethical behavior (Reynolds, 2006) and social conformity (Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jugert, Cohrs, & Duckitt, 2009). Personal Need for Structure 
(PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1989) describes the 
degree to which individuals prefer to process environmental information in a way that offers 
structure and allows them to feel in control. Individuals high in PNS feel uncomfortable when 
the rules in a situation are not clear and thus arrange their social interactions in ways that 
enable them to avoid complexity and retain their simple structures. Individuals low in PNS, in 
contrast, are more open to divergent information and thus should be more likely to consider 
broader consequences. If a leader provides meaning for an event or frames advice in a way 
that seems appropriate for the follower (e.g., because the suggested option is in the best 
interest of the organization), followers high in PNS might be more willing to act in line with 
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this advice whereas people low in PNS may consider the broader consequences. To show that 
IFTs have a unique effect above and beyond this alternative explanation, we control for PNS 
in our study. 
Measures 
Contribution to unethical leadership was operationalized as the extent to which the 
participants followed a leader’s advice to discriminate in personnel selection, as described in 
more detail in the procedure section. Drawing on previous research (Brief et al., 2000), 
discrimination was measured as the number of foreign applicants selected to be invited to a 
job interview. The range was from 0 (no foreign applicants selected) to 3 points (three foreign 
applicants selected), with lower numbers indicating more discrimination. 
Implicit followership theories were measured using Sy’s (2010) 18-item measure. As 
described in the theory section, the six dimensions of the IFTs are represented by three items 
each. Participants rate how typical each item (e.g., “Loyal”) is for a follower.  
Moral disengagement was measured using Moore et al.’s (2012) Propensity to 
Morally Disengage scale. The scale assesses eight forms of moral disengagement with one 
item each. For example, diffusion of responsibility is measured with the item “People can’t 
be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are doing it too.” 
Moore et al. suggest aggregating the scores on the eight items to form a comprehensive score.  
Romance of Leadership (ROL) was measured using nine items that represented the 
core factor of the original ROL Scale (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1988; Schyns, Meindl, & Croon, 
2007). In our study, we used the nine items (e.g., “When it comes right down to it, the quality 
of leadership is the single most important influence in the functioning of an organization”) 
that showed highest loadings on this core factor in the four samples of Schyns et al.’s 
validation study.  
Personal Need for Structure (PNS) was measured using the German version 
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(Machunsky & Meiser, 2006) of the 11-item scale that Neuberg and Newsom (1993) 
developed on basis of Thompson et al.’s (1989) PNS scale (sample item: “I become 
uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are unclear”).  
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
On average, the participants selected 1.23 (SD = .62) immigrant applicants. 
Participants of the control group selected 1.34 immigrants as job candidates while 
participants of the experimental group selected 1.13 immigrants. A one-way ANOVA 
showed that the difference between control group and experimental group was significant, F 
(186) = 5.69, p = .02. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities, and zero-
order correlations for all study variables. 
-------Please insert Table 1 about here ------- 
Hypotheses testing 
After controlling for Personal Need for Structure (PNS), Moral Disengagement (MD), 
and Romance of Leadership (ROL), we expected that participants’ tendency to contribute to 
unethical leadership when confronted with a relevant advice given by a leader would be 
higher for the IFTs Conformity, Industry, Enthusiasm, and Good Citizen (Hypothesis 1) and 
lower for the IFT Insubordination (Hypothesis 2). To test this moderation effect, we 
conducted seven regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). As shown in Table 2, in a first 
step (model 0), we included age, gender, nationality and the control variables PNS, ROL, and 
MD in the regression. In a second step (models 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a), we included the z-
standardized scores for condition and one of the IFTs per regression. In a third step (models 
1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b), we included the interaction term of condition and the relevant IFT 
dimension.  
-------Please insert Table 2 about here ------- 
IMPLICIT FOLLOWERSHIP THEORIES AND UNETHICAL LEADERSHIP 15 
Table 2 shows that including the interaction between condition and the IFT Good 
Citizen increased explained variance by 3% (β = -.16, p = .02). As can be seen in Figure 1, 
simple slopes show that for employees high in the IFT Good Citizen, the suggestion to 
discriminate decreases the number of selected immigrants, t(176) = -3.34, p < .01, indicating 
that followers high in the IFT Good Citizen contribute to unethical leadership more readily 
than those low in this IFT dimension. Regression analyses did not reveal significant 
contributions (all ΔR2 ≤ .01) for interaction terms including condition and the IFT dimensions 
Conformity (β = .02, p = .76), Industry (β = -.05, p = .55), or Enthusiasm (β = .01, p = .95). 
Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported for the IFT Good Citizen only. 
-------Please insert Figure 1 about here ------- 
Table 2 also shows that including the interaction between condition and the IFT 
dimension Insubordination increased the explained variance by 3% (β = .14, p = .05), thus 
supporting Hypothesis 2. As shown in Figure 2, simple slopes show that for employees low 
in Insubordination, the suggestion to discriminate decreases the number of selected 
immigrants (t(176) = -3.26, p < .01). Thus, followers who associate the follower role with 
insubordination are less likely to behave in line with the unethical advice. The interaction 
term comprising condition and the IFT Incompetence was non-significant (ΔR2 = .00, β = .03, 
p = .71).  
-------Please insert Figure 2 about here ------- 
Discussion 
In this study, we examined the degree to which followers contribute to unethical 
leadership depending on their IFTs. Our experimental study showed that, as expected, 
participants holding the IFT Good Citizen complied more strongly with a leader’s advice to 
discriminate in a personnel selection task, and participants high in the IFT dimension 
Insubordination were less willing to discriminate when the leader suggested doing so. Thus, 
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employees who are more inclined to think of followers as loyal and team players can actually 
become part of a process that is unethical, although their image of followers might be 
considered to be positive. We did not find this effect for the other positively connoted IFTs 
Industry and Enthusiasm, and also not for Conformity. In Study 2, we refine our experimental 
design to further investigate why these effects were so specific for the IFT Good Citizen. 
Study 2 
In this study, we aim to replicate and specify our most important Study 1 finding – the 
possibility that associating the follower role with being a good citizen might have detrimental 
effects. To specify the conditions under which employees high in the IFT Good Citizen 
contribute to unethical leadership, we extended our experimental design to differentiate the 
type of advices the leader gives. 
When developing Hypothesis 1, we proposed that employees who implicitly associate 
the follower role with being a good citizen contribute to unethical leadership, because they 
aim at benefitting the organization. In line with this assumption, results from Study 1 showed 
that employees high in the IFT Good Citizen contributed to unethical leadership when the 
leader linked his advice to discriminate to a positive outcome for the organization (i.e., 
advantages of a more homogeneous group constitution). Without this link, the IFT Good 
Citizen was not related to discrimination. Based on Study 1, we cannot be sure whether 
individuals high in the IFT Good Citizen wanted to benefit the organization or simply 
followed the unethical leader’s advice to comply with the leader. This is an important 
distinction as it specifies the conditions under which followers will contribute to unethical 
leadership.  
The basic idea behind Organ's (1988) concept of organizational citizenship behavior 
and Sy's (2010) IFT Good Citizen is that a good citizen is motivated to contribute to the 
greater good of a defined community. Therefore, followers who associate the follower role 
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with being a good citizen differ from conformists who merely follow instructions and 
colluders who support unethical leaders due to selfish interests (Thoroughgood et al., 2012). 
We assume that individuals high in the IFT Good Citizen contribute to unethical leadership 
only when it is linked to positive outcomes for the community they belong to (here: the 
organization). This effect should, consequently, not manifest in situations in which a leader 
advises his or her followers to contribute to unethical leadership but does not link the 
behavior to the good of the organization. Therefore, we expect:  
Hypothesis 3: IFT Good Citizen moderates the relationship between a leader’s advice 
to contribute to unethical leadership and compliance only when the leader links his or her 
advice to positive organizational outcomes. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample was comprised of 165 employees (55% female) with a mean age of 39.66 
(SD = 12.39) years. Sixty-eight per cent of the employees held entry-level positions, 15% 
were in lower management, and 16% were in middle or higher management. Thirty-seven per 
cent worked in small organizations of up to 20 employees, 35% worked in medium-sized 
organizations of 21-500 employees, and 27% worked in bigger organizations of more than 
500 employees. Different industries were represented in the sample, most of which were 
social and health care (25%), education (17%), industry and production (14%), and sales 
(9%). In contrast to Study 1, which was an online-study, participants were contacted by 
students from the third authors’ university and received printed versions of the in-basket 
exercise in Study 2. We distributed an equal number of questionnaires for all three 
conditions. Resulting differences in participants assigned to the conditions are random. 
Procedure 
We used the same in-basket exercise as in Study 1, however, Study 2 consisted of the 
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control condition (no advice to discriminate against immigrants) and two experimental 
conditions. In the first experimental condition, the CEO merely gave the advice to 
discriminate against immigrants without justification. In the second experimental condition, 
the CEO linked his advice to discriminate against immigrants to the benefit of the 
organization similar to Study 1. This extended design allows examining whether followers 
with high values in specific IFTs contribute to unethical leadership merely to comply with an 
unethical leader (Experimental Condition 1) or to benefit the company (Experimental 
Condition 2).  
Controlling for Alternative Explanations 
We controlled for the influence of individual differences variables that were linked to 
followers' contributions to unethical behaviors in the past. Besides moral disengagement and 
need for structure that were already included in Study 1, we included authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 1996) instead of ROL in Study 2. While ROL describes individual's tendencies 
to assign influence to a leader, authoritarianism is more about follower conformity.  
The concept of authoritarianism has its roots in the authoritarian personality research 
that was introduced after World War II as an explanation for why people fell to the influence 
of unethical authorities (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Altemeyer 
(1996) revised the rather descriptive previous conceptualizations and introduced a 
conceptualization of authoritarianism comprising of three dimensions, namely 
submissiveness to authorities, aggressiveness against norm deviants, and adherence to 
conventional norms. Subsequent research suggested that focusing on the specific dimensions 
may be more promising than considering authoritarianism as a unidimensional construct (e.g., 
Funke, 2005). In order to understand followers' tendency to contribute to unethical acts that 
are suggested by a leader, authoritarian submission and conservatism seem most relevant as 
compared to aggressiveness (see also Feldman, 2003). Individuals with a tendency to be 
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submissive towards authorities are willing to subordinate individual autonomy to authority 
figures. High conventionalism is associated with a tendency to follow and support existing 
practices. Followers who sore high on both dimensions are expected to have a rather low 
tendency to question suggestions made by authority figures. 
Measures  
We used the same measures for the IFTs with the exception of the IFT Conformity. 
As one item from this scale, "soft spoken", had very low item-total correlations and thus was 
lowering the alpha reliability of the scale, we discussed alternative translations and changed 
the wording into "docile". 
To assess contributions to unethical leadership, we created two scores. One score was 
identical to the one used in Study 1 and accounted for the total number of immigrants 
selected. A second score adjusted the selection score due to the order of preference. As 
participants were asked to bring the three recommended applicants in an order with the most 
recommended applicant on top, the position that foreign applicants were assigned to may 
provide additional evidence for discrimination. A participant may, for example, fulfil 
expectations of social desirability or reassure herself by including a foreign applicant in the 
list, however, assign him or her to a position that makes it less likely that this applicant is 
considered. In the adjusted score, an individual who selected an immigrant on position 1 was 
assigned 3 points; for selecting an immigrant on position 2, we assigned 2 points, and for 
selecting an immigrant on position 3, we assigned 1 point. Thus, values for the adjusted 
second score ranged from 0 (no foreign applicants selected) to 6 points (three foreign 
applicants selected), lower numbers indicating more discrimination. 
We assessed control variables moral disengagement and need for structure using the 
same scales as in Study 1. Authoritarian submission and conventionalism were measured 
with the respective three-item subscales of a German version (Beierlein, Asbrock, Kauff, & 
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Schmidt, 2014) of Altemeyer's authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 1996). Example items 
were "We should be grateful for having leaders who tell us exactly what we should do" for 
submission and "Established practices should not be questioned" for conventionalism. 
Results  
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities, and zero-order correlations 
among the variables. As can be seen, on average, participants selected 1.32 (SD = 0.56) 
immigrants. A one-way ANOVA revealed that the difference between the groups 
representing the three conditions of the experiment was significant, F(2, 162) = 15.66, p < 
.01. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the total number of 
selected immigrants was lower in the second experimental group (M = 1.02, SD = 0.45) 
compared to the control group (M = 1.55, SD = 0.54; p < .01) and the first experimental 
group (M = 1.37, SD = 0.56; p <.01). There was no statistically significant difference between 
the control condition and the first experimental condition (p = .17) in which the superior's 
advice (i.e., discrimination) was not linked to the good of the organization.  
-------Please insert Table 3 about here ------- 
As the total number of selected immigrants masks whether immigrants were selected 
as first, second, or third choice, we created an additional, more specific measure as a second 
criterion. More specifically, we assigned more points to higher rankings. As expected and 
mirroring the effects for the total number of selected immigrants, the score for the second 
experimental group (M = 1.88, SD = 1.13) was lower than the score for the control group (M 
= 3.29, SD = 1.24) and the first experimental group (M = 2.69, SD = 1.38). A one-way 
ANOVA showed that this difference was significant, F(2, 162) = 18.43, p < .01. Notably, for 
the adjusted score, there was also a statistically significant difference between the control 
condition and the first experimental condition (p = .03). Thus, both scores indicate that 
participants who received the advice from their superior not to select immigrants as potential 
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job candidates choose fewer immigrants, and this tendency was particularly low if the leader 
linked his unethical advice to the good of the organization.To replicate findings from Study 1, 
we conducted multiple regression analyses including the z-standardized scores of the IFTs 
and condition (which included the two conditions we had in Study 1, namely Control 
condition and Experimental Condition 2 in Step 1 along with the control variables. In the 
second step, we included the interaction of Condition and the respective IFTs. Similar to 
Study 1, there was no interaction effect for the IFTs Conformity, Enthusiasm, and Industry. 
As it has been shown in Study 1 and (again) supporting Hypothesis 1, including the 
interaction between Condition and the IFT Good Citizen increased the explained variance, by 
3% (β = -.17, p = .05). Using the adjusted score as dependent variable revealed the same 
results, ΔR
2
 = .03%, β = -.17, p = .04. 
As our Study 2 design included a multicategorical predictor variable, we used the 
PROCESS version 2.15 macro Model 1 as described in Hayes and Montoya (2016) to test 
Hypothesis 3. In this model, the type of condition was entered as predictor, the IFT Good 
citizen as the moderator, and number of immigrants selected as the outcome variable. Gender, 
age, moral disengagement, need for structure, and the two authoritarianism dimensions were 
included as control variables. We used the condition with no advice given by the superior as 
control condition; and PROCESS created two condition dummy variables: D1 coding the first 
experimental condition (i.e., the condition in which the superior's advice was not linked to the 
good of the organization was coded 1, and the other two conditions were coded 0), and D2 
coding the second experimental condition (i.e., the condition in which the superior linked his 
unethical advice to the good of the organization was coded 1, and the other two conditions 
were coded 0). Results are shown in Table 4. 
-------Please insert Table 4 about here ------- 
PROCESS outputs showed a R
2
 for the unconstrained model of R
2
 = .24, F(11, 150) = 
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4.52, p < .01. Test of moderation shows a change in R
2
 resulting from adding both product 
terms of ΔR2 = .02, F(2,150) = 2.48, p = .09. Supporting Hypothesis 3, the product term of D2 
by IFT Good Citizen was significant (b = -.22, SE = .10, p = .03) whereas the product term of 
D1 by IFT Good Citizen was not (b = -.03, SE = .16, p = .85). When using the adjusted score, 
the results were similar with slightly stronger effects: R
2
 for the unconstrained model was .28, 
F(11, 150) = 6.02, p < .01. Test of moderation showed a change in R
2
 resulting from adding 
both product terms of ΔR2 = .03, F(2,150) = 2.65, p = .07. Supporting Hypothesis 3, the 
product term of D2 by IFT Good Citizen was significant (b = -.57, SE = .26, p = .03) whereas 
the product term of D1 by IFT Good Citizen was not (b = -.07, SE = .34, p = .84). To 
visualize the differences in the interaction effects, we plotted the slopes for the control 
condition and the two experimental conditions in Figure 3.  
-------Please insert Figure 3 about here ------- 
Simple slope analysis revealed that when it was linked to the good of the company, a 
superior's advice to discriminate decreased the number of selected immigrants for employees 
low in IFT Good Citizen (-1SD, b = -.39, SE = .15, t = -2.63, p < .01) and high in IFT Good 
Citizen (+1 SD, b = -.78, SE = .12, t = -6.35, p < .001). When the superior's advice was not 
linked to the good of the company (Experimental Condition 1) it did neither decrease the 
number of selected immigrants for employees' low in IFT Good Citizen (-1SD, b = -.17, SE = 
.18, t = -0.94, p = .35) nor high in IFT Good Citizen (+1 SD, b = -.22, SE = .18, t = -1.26, p = 
.21).  
Discussion 
Study 2 results replicate findings from Study 1 for the IFT Good Citizen with a 
different control variable and an additional adjusted score for the dependent variable. To 
address potential method and sample effects, we used a more mature sample and conducted 
the in-basket-exercise as a paper-and-pencil version instead of online assessment. More 
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importantly, the extended experimental design specifies the conditions under which the IFT 
Good Citizen relates to unethical leadership. The pattern of results shown in Figure 3 suggest 
that higher values in the IFT Good Citizen increase followers' tendency to contribute to 
unethical leadership only if the leader links unethical requests to the good of the company. 
General Discussion 
In two studies, we examined to what degree employees’ implicit assumptions 
regarding the follower role as measured by their IFTs influence their tendency to contribute 
to unethical leadership. In Study 1, we found that employees who score high on the IFT Good 
Citizen were more likely and those scoring high on the IFT Insubordination were less likely 
to comply with a leader’s advice to discriminate in a personnel selection decision. In Study 2, 
we could replicate the findings for the IFT Good Citizen. Study 2 results furthermore showed 
that employees who scored high on the IFT Good Citizen only comply when the leader linked 
his unethical advice to the benefit of the organization. When the leader merely advised to 
conduct unethical behavior, the IFT Good Citizen was not related to follower compliance. 
The pattern of results indicates that employees who associate the follower role with being a 
good citizen may contribute to unethical leadership when it is linked to the benefit of the 
organization.  
In sum, our research suggests that considering followers’ implicit theories enriches 
our understanding of followers' involvement in unethical organizational practices. Note that 
the proposed unique effect of the IFT Good Citizen held when controlling for a number of 
alternative explanations, that are individual differences in 1) the tendency to displace 
responsibility to a leader (Romance of Leadership), 2) the preference for social conformity 
(Authoritarianism), 3) the tendency to mentally reframe the situation so that it appears as less 
immoral (Moral Disengagement), and 4) cognitive rigidity (Personal Need for Structure). The 
specific findings with regard to the way the IFT Good Citizen was linked to the experimental 
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conditions furthermore suggest considering IFTs as a variable whose meaning emerges 
within context. This may include that employees construct the follower role not merely in 
reference to the leader but also in reference to the organization they want to benefit.  
Implications for the understanding of (followers' contribution to) unethical leadership  
Our findings provide evidence for the argument (e.g., Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2013; 
Padilla et al., 2007) that followers’ role in unethical leadership is not restricted to being a 
victim or a passive bystander, but that they actively contribute to unethical outcomes. 
Notably, followers who contributed to unethical leadership were not the ones high in 
negatively connoted characteristics as it has been suggested by prior research (e.g., 
Thoroughgood et al., 2012), but those who associated the follower role with a positive value 
(i.e., the good citizen image). This finding supports and extends prior research and theory that 
suggested a potential downside of positive employee characteristics (Judge et al., 2009; 
Umphress & Bingham, 2010). The meaning of follower characteristics seem to reveal itself 
when considered in interaction with situational demands.  
In addition to showing that followers’ susceptibility to unethical leadership does not 
always require embracing negative traits or motives, our findings indicate that followers’ 
involvement in unethical leadership is not necessarily the result of a conscious decision to 
contribute to a negative process (e.g., to avoid negative consequences for oneself and/or 
approach personal gains; Padilla et al., 2007). In line with recent developments in the field of 
behavioral ethics (Haidt, 2001; Reynolds et al., 2010), our findings suggest that the 
elaboration-based view on (un)ethical behavior needs to be complemented by considering 
more automatic information processes involved in peoples’ decision making and behavior. 
By showing the influence of implicit theories (here: IFTs) in the unfolding of unethical acts 
(here: discrimination), our findings suggest that subtle and insidious facilitators (Bargh, 1997, 
Detert & Edmondson, 2011) may also increase followers’ susceptibility to unethical 
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leadership. 
Implications for research on implicit followership theories 
Our results enrich the existing knowledge about IFTs as we provided evidence that 
IFTs do not only influence how followers are perceived by leaders as shown in prior research 
(e.g., Whiteley, Sy, & Johnson, 2012), but also influence how followers behave. Our research 
also emphasizes that it might be useful to rethink whether the IFTs as suggested by Sy (2010) 
are exhaustive. For example, Sy’s IFT dimensions do not cover attributes associated with 
courageous followership and constructive dissent (Chaleff, 1995; Riggio, Chaleff, & Lipman-
Blumen, 2008; Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2007). As a consequence, only the IFT Insubordination 
emerged as a predictor of employees’ refusal to follow an unethical leader’s suggestion in 
Study 1. However, associating followership with being “arrogant” and “rude” is hardly 
something one would recommend organizations to encourage among their workforce. Hence, 
a more comprehensive approach to followership theories should include forms of challenging 
the status quo that are more compatible with reasonable organizational practice. Notably, 
indicators of such a facet did occur in Sy’s pre-studies but the respective items were omitted 
during the scale development process. Besides considering these items, further attempts could 
draw upon Carsten et al.’s (2010) findings that followers construct their role not only along 
the dimensions of passive and active, but also as proactive. This is indicated by categories 
such as integrity, expressing opinions, and taking ownership. Finally, an extended spectrum 
of IFTs could cover more controversial facets of follower characteristics and behaviors 
without labeling them as negative (see Collinson, 2006, for a discussion on a broader 
spectrum of possible follower identities).  
Our attempts to specify the conditions under which followers comply with a leader's 
unethical advice contribute to the debate on whether to view followers as part of a 
hierarchical relationship (i.e., the leader-follower dyad) or as co-creators of a leadership 
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process (Shamir, 2007; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). The finding that followers who scored high on 
the IFT Good Citizen only complied with the leader’s unethical advice when it was linked to 
benefitting the organization suggests that followers construct their role not merely in 
reference to the leader but as part of the organizational context. This implies that context may 
not only function as moderating the relationship between follower characteristics and 
outcomes but to co-define how followers construct their role (Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2012). 
Limitations and directions for future research 
Our findings indicate that followers’ positive associations with the follower role may 
lead to negative outcomes. However, we only examined one form of unethical behavior (i.e., 
discrimination) and one way in which followers contribute to unethical leadership (i.e., by 
following a leader's advice not to select immigrants). Although situations in which followers 
actively contribute to unethical leadership are more dangerous compared to acts of omission, 
it is not clear which IFTs might be relevant in the latter. For example, conformity, which did 
not relate to participants' discriminating behavior in our study, might contribute to more 
passive forms of unethical followership such as remaining silent when observing a leader’s 
unethical behavior (Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2012). We furthermore focused on an ambivalent 
situation which allowed the participants to view the unethical act in a positive light (i.e., as it 
was proposed to benefit the company). Note that we did not create a situation to trap 
participants, but to highlight the susceptibility of well-meaning followers in moral grey 
zones, "situations that are morally ambiguous and in which leaders and followers together 
engage in practices that are likely to harm others, yet might benefit the organization, the 
follower, or the leader" (Knoll et al., 2016, p. 66; see also Anteby, 2008). Future research 
could examine whether the results differ when followers are asked to contribute to clearly 
unethical acts such as theft or bullying.  
We are aware that our methodological approach using an experimental design to 
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examine the interaction between an unethical leader's advice and follower IFTs might raise 
questions regarding the external validity of our findings (Gorman, Clover, & Doherty, 1978) 
and to what extent our results may be explained by demand effects (Orne, 2009; Rosenthal & 
Rosnow, 2009). Demand effects would suggest that, in the treatment condition, participants 
were doing simply what they were told to do as a function of what makes sense for the 
organization in a hypothetical situation. However, the differentiated results somewhat 
question this possibility. Note that we found the effects for the IFT Good Citizen only (and 
not for the IFT Industry, for example) and only in one of the two experimental conditions. 
We cannot say whether participants might act differently when they receive instructions from 
an actual superior. However, in a simulation, participants could quite easily refuse to comply 
with an unethical leader whereas at their workplace, when they have a psychologically 
significant relationship with their supervisor and a rejection may result in negative 
consequences, their behavior might be even more compliant. As discussed in more detail by 
Petersen and Krings (2009), in simulations, the tendency to follow authorities might be 
under- rather than overestimated. Thus, although evidence exists that the paradigm we used 
(i.e., in-basket exercise) can realistically simulate the actual decision making environments of 
managers (Bartol & Martin, 1990) and has been used in research on unethical behavior before 
(e.g., Brief et al., 2000; Reynolds et al., 2010), our findings are just a first step in establishing 
the role of IFTs as influencing unethical work behavior. The next steps will include further 
replications, ideally implemented in the work context.  
Finally, our research is a first attempt to show that IFTs, in our case, the IFT Good 
Citizen, can have detrimental effects as they influenced followers' into contributing to 
unethical leadership, if their leader framed his request in a way that it supposedly benefits the 
organization. At this stage, we only know that IFTs affect employees' decisions; future 
research needs to specify at which stage of the decision-making process (Rest, 1986) this 
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impact occurs. For example, did participants with high values in IFT Good Citizen notice that 
discriminating against immigrants was an unethical act but complied with the leader's request 
anyway, or did their IFTs bias their perception of the situation in a way that they did not think 
an ethical issue was given (Moore & Gino, 2013; Reynolds, 2006). Even more subtle, their 
IFTs could bias participants' perception of applicants' qualification for the job. Although we 
cannot do this based on our data, future research could extend our paradigm to examine the 
stages in the (un)ethical decision-making process in more detail. Awareness of an ethical 
issue, for example, could be assessed by including a section in which participants rate 
whether they view preferring domestic applicants over better qualified immigrants as 
unethical (see Knoll et al., 2016 for a similar procedure). Potentially biased perception of 
applicants' qualifications could be assessed by including a section in which participants rate 
the qualification of each applicant (see Petersen & Dietz, 2000, 2008).  
Conclusion 
Interpretations of classical social psychological studies and historical cases of 
unethical leadership (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Arendt, 1963; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 
1973; Milgram, 1974) suggest that merely accepting the follower role and being confronted 
with a leader’s advice triggers obedience. However, not everyone contributed to unethical 
outcomes in the same way, neither in historical situations nor in psychological experiments 
(Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Reicher & Haslam, 2006). Moreover, historians and sociologists 
(e.g., Bauman, 1989; Browning, 1992; Hilberg, 1992) question the common-sense 
assumption that only bad people do bad things emphasizing the need to understand how and 
why ‘ordinary men’ contribute to unethical practices in general and unethical leadership in 
particular. In this paper, we combined research into unethical behavior and into followership 
to examine further which characteristics of followers (in this case, their IFTs) make them 
susceptible to unethical leadership. We examined employees’ contribution to unethical 
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leadership as the result of a sense-making process that depends on followers’ active (but not 
necessarily conscious) construction of the follower role. We showed that, as this construction 
involves the interaction of person characteristics and contextual variables, the meaning of 
follower characteristics and their consequences may change depending on the configuration 
of context and situation.  
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, alpha reliabilities, and zero-order correlations for Study 1 variables 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Age  32.06 8.53 -            
2 Gender
a
 1.80 0.40 -.05 -           
3 Need for structure 4.30 0.76 -.13 .03 .84          
4 
Romance of 
Leadership 
4.85 0.82 .18* -.03 .16* .85         
5 
Moral Dis-
engagement 
2.47 0.81 -.19* -.14 .15*  .02 .72        
6 IFT
b
 Industry 4.88 0.87 -.04  .03  .18* .08  .00 .76       
7 IFT Enthusiasm  3.95 0.73 -.09  .08  .14 .12 -.04 .55** .60      
8 IFT Good Citizen  4.76 0.88 .10 -.04  .15* -.05 .02 .61** .38** .75     
9 IFT Conformity  4.17 0.83 .06  .01  .02 -.03 -.09 -.03 -.19** .14 .56    
10 IFT Incompetence  2.90 0.84 .02 -.13 -.13 -.04 .06 -.39** -.20** -.24** .38** .75   
11 
IFT 
Insubordination 
3.10 0.93 -.03 -.04 -.03 .03 .09 -.21** -.03 -.50**  .13 .53** .76  
12 
Immigrants 
selected 
1.23 0.62 -.17*  .02 -.04 -.07 -.02 -.10 -.08 -.19** -.06 .01 .12 - 
13 Condition
c
 0.50 0.50 .04 .07 -.11 -.12 -.04 .03 .02 -.05  .02 -.01 .10 -.17* 
Notes.  N =187 (control group n = 92; experimental group n = 95). 
a
Gender 1 = male, 2 = female. 
b
IFT=Implicit Followership Theories. 
c
Condition 0 = Control Group, 1= 
Experimental Group. Alpha Reliabilities in italics. ** p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05.   
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Table 2. Multiple regression analysis predicting discrimination with Condition, Implicit Followership Theories (IFTs), and their Interaction 
while controlling for Personal Need for Structure (PNS), Romance of Leadership (ROL), and Moral Disengagement (MD), Study 1 
IFT  Conformity Industry Enthusiasm Good Citizen Insubordination Incompetence 
Model 0 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 6b 
              
Age .22
**
 .20
**
 .20
**
 .21
**
 .20
**
 .22
**
 .22
**
 .17
**
 .16
**
 .20
**
 .19
**
 .21
**
 .20
**
 
Gender
a
 -.10  .00  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 -.00 -.01 . 01  .01  .00  .01 
Nationality  .04  .04  .04  .03  .03  .04  .04  .02  .01  .02  .01  .03  .04 
PNS -.04 -.06 -.06 -.05 -.04 -.05 -.05 -.03 -.01 -.06 -.07 -.06 -.06 
ROL -.03 -.05 -.05 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.07 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.05 -.04 
MD -.08 -.09 -.09 -.08 -.08 -.09 -.08 -.07 -.08 -.09 -.08 -.08 -.08 
Condition  -.17
*
 -.17
*
 -.16
*
 -.16
*
 -.16
*
 -.16
*
 -.18
*
 -.18
**
 -.18
*
 -.19
**
 -.17
*
 -.17
*
 
IFT  -.08 -.08 -.08 -.09 -.09 -.09 -.19
**
 -.19
**
 .12 .14 -.01  .00 
IFT x Condition   .02  -.05   .01  -.16
*
  .14
*
  .03 
              
∆R²  .03*b .00c .03*b .00c .03*b .00c .06**b .03*c .04*b .02**c .03b .00c 
R² .05 .08 .08 .08 .09 .08 .08 .14 .17 .09 .11 .08 .08 
Notes. N = 187. PNS = Personal Need for Structure; ROL = Romance of Leadership; MD = Moral Disengagement; Condition: 0 = control group without suggestion to 
discriminate, 1 = experimental group with suggestion to discriminate by superior; Dependent variable is number of immigrants selected, negative relations indicate less 
immigrants selected and therefore more discrimination. 
a
male = 1, female = 2. 
b
incremental validity compared to model 0; 
c
incremental validity compared to the respective 
models 1a-6a. 
**
 p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05. 
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Table 3. Means, standard deviations, alpha reliabilities, and zero-order correlations for Study 2 variables 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Age 39.75 12.41 -              
2 Gender
a
 1.55 0.50 -.01 -             
3 
Moral 
Disengagement 
2.51 0.88 -.10 -.13 .78          
  
4 Need for Structure 4.14 0.67 -.07 -.03 .15 .81           
5 
Author. 
Submission 
3.77 1.25 -.07 -.13 .28
**
 .32
**
 .78        
  
6 Conventionalism 3.24 1.15 .11 -.00 .28
**
 .40
**
 .37
**
 .75         
7 IFT Industry 4.85 0.87 -.08 .06 -.11 .08 .17
*
 .25
**
 .74        
8 IFT Enthusiasm  3.85 0.95 -.11 .06 .07 .20
**
 .20
*
 .09 .33
**
 .75       
9 IFT Good citizen  5.01 0.90 .05 -.09 -.12 .22
**
 .26
**
 .27
**
 .47
**
 .35
**
 .81      
10 IFT Conformity  4.07 1.08 -.22
*
 -.16
*
 .26
**
 .08 .17
*
 .15 .08 .05 -.03 .82     
11 IFT Incompetence  2.69 0.93 -.05 -.05 .29
**
 -.11 .06 -.07 -.29
**
 -.10 -.22
**
 .38
**
 .71    
12 
IFT 
Insubordination 
2.52 1.20 -.17
**
 -.08 .24
**
 -.01 -.03 -.07 -.23
**
 .02 -.33
**
 .37
**
 .53
**
 .91 
  
13 
Immigrants 
selected
b
 
1.32 0.56 .02 -.03 -.10 .04 -.08 -.08 .21** .20** .14 -.07 -.03 -.02 
-  
14 
Immigrants 
selected adjusted 
score
c
 
2.62 1.38 -.02 .03 -.19
*
 .03 -.09 -.06 .22
**
 .25
**
 .18
*
 -.06 -.02 -.06 .82
**
 - 
15 Condition
d
 1.99 0.83 .13 -.04 .01 .00 .06 -.13 -.16* -.24
**
 -.07 -.05 -.08 -.07 -.40
**
 -.43
**
 
Notes.  N =164 (control group n = 57; experimental group 1 n = 51; experimental group 2 n = 56).  
a
male = 1, female = 2. 
b
Number of immigrants selected, immigrants 
selected indicate more discrimination. 
c
Adjusted score for number of immigrants selected in which order of selection is considered. 
d
Condition was coded 1 = no advice to 
discriminate, 2 = leader's advice to discriminate linked to the good of the company, and 3 = leader's advice to discriminate not linked to the good of the company. 
IFT=Implicit Followership Theories. ** p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05.  
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Table 4. Regressions of type of Condition (no advice to discriminate, advice not linked to the 
good of the company, advice linked to the good of the company) on number of immigrants 
selected (lower number indicate discrimination) when employees’ Implicit Followership 
Theory (IFT) Good Citizen is the moderator, Study 2 
 b SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Constant 1.51 0.46 3.28 .00 0.60 2.42 
Gender -0.04 0.09 -0.44 .66 -0.21 0.13 
Age 0.00 0.00 1.13 .26 -0.00 0.01 
Moral Disengagement -0.02 0.05 -0.31 .76 -0.12 0.09 
Need for Structure 0.10 0.08 1.19 .24 -0.07 0.26 
Authoritar. Submission -0.02 0.04 -0.34 .73 -0.10 0.07 
Conventionalism -0.11 0.05 -2.49 .02 -0.20 -0.02 
IFT Good Citizen 0.16 0.09 1.81 .07 -0.02 0.34 
D1 -0.20 0.11 -1.74 .08 -0.42 0.03 
D2 -0.58 0.10 -5.81 .00 -0.78 -0.38 
D1xIFT Good Citizen -0.03 0.16 -0.18 .85 -0.34 0.28 
D2xIFT Good Citizen -0.22 0.10 -2.14 .03 -0.42 -0.02 
Note. b = unstandardized beta weight, SE = standard error, D1= Experimental condition 1 = 1 
and Control condition and Experimental condition 2 = 0, D2= Experimental condition 2 = 1 
and Control condition and Experimental condition 1 = 0. 
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Figure 1. Interaction plot of Implicit Followership Theory (IFT) Good Citizen and condition 
on discrimination (measured as number of immigrants selected, range from 0 to 3, low scores 
meaning less immigrants selected)  
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Figure 2. Interaction plot of Implicit Followership Theory (IFT) Insubordination and 
condition on discrimination (measured as number of immigrants selected, range from 0 to 3, 
low scores meaning less immigrants selected)  
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Figure 3. Interaction plot of Implicit Followership Theory (IFT) Good Citizen and 
Experimental conditions (CG = Control Condition, no advice to discriminate; EG1 = 
Experimental Condition 1, advice to discriminate not linked to the good of the company; EG2 
= Experimental Condition 2, advice to discriminate linked to the good of the company) on 
discrimination (measured as number of immigrants selected, range from 0 to 3, low scores 
meaning fewer immigrants selected) 
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